This article contains an outline of the most important theoretical approaches that have addressed the role of women within the family. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, in which women training Liberal created partnerships to claim their rights, to radical questioning paradigms all social relationships to eliminate gender inequalities. An evolution of the social and political theory with feminism as a hub, affecting every aspect of life women: motherhood, work and, of course, family.

The study of brain changes in response to mindfulness (MF) practice could serve as a way to expand our understanding of key cognitive processes such as consciousness, attention, or executive functions. The aim of this work is to offer an updated review of the studies that have investigated the effects of MF on cognition; specifically, the processes of consciousness, attention, and executive functioning, measured by evoked potentials (EP). The main studies on this topic from 2006 to the present are reviewed (...) and the principal findings are grouped according to the EP measured, mainly N1, N2, and P3. The convergent evidence derived from the updated research allows us to propose a hypothetical model of the existing correlations between the influences of MF on cognitive processes and the associated EP components. However, the methodological limitations found mean that we should take these results with caution and advise a methodological refinement for future research. (shrink)

Physicalism is the default position in science and in the philosophy of mind, but it should not be, I argue, because of two errors. By its epistemological error, physicalism gives physics priority over the evidence of first person experience. Only what I experience in first person is certain, so observation is prior to any theory. Physics itself is based on observation, avoiding the epistemological error, and then physics can progress, even changing its own ontology. However, physicalism imposes the ontology of (...) physics on every science, and in physics everything is causal. By its ontological error, physicalism tries to explain causally what is intentional. And it happens that causality and intentionality are mutually exclusive, showing that the ontology of physics is insufficient wherever intentions are present. This ontological insufficiency prevents that physicalism can repeat the success of physics with any science where intentions play a rôle, and thus it is blocking the advance of both the social sciences and the philosophy of mind. To overcome this obstacle, I propose to go back to the essentials: we should consider again the transcendental problem raised by Descartes and its solutions by Hume and Kant. On top of this subjectivist solution, we should take advantage of Darwin and Turing, and we should extend our ontology beyond causality to include intentionality, and here my proposal is problem solving. Then you could join our Post-Kantian subjectivism and say with me: The world is not a huge machine, as physicalism proposes, but an enigmatic problem. (shrink)

The article bears an implicit appeal to judge political programs not by ideological labels but rather by the criteria I call ‘decency.’ I enjoin Martin Buber’s concept of dialogue to argue that a politics of decency seeks to promote human well-being that reaches beyond mere material flourishing but is attentive to the full sweep of the regnant existential, social and politics realities that diminish fundamental human dignity. Such a political ethic, as Buber would put it, transcends the barriers of regarding (...) others as “It” – as perceived and conceived by the divisive categories of religious and cultural affiliation, age, sexual orientation, socalled race, and as inveterate political opponents. (shrink)

What place, if any, does love have in Kantian ethics? This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss Kant’s own account of moral versus non-moral love as found throughout his various writings and show how this closely parallels his account of moral versus non-moral friendship. Second, I discuss contemporary Kantian accounts of both friendship and love, highlighting how they go beyond, and in some ways seem to significantly improve upon, Kant’s own views via their appeal to Kant’s Formula (...) of Humanity. Lastly, I discuss the overall merits of what I call ‘Kantian moral love’. I argue that while Kantian moral love might rightly identify, from the moral point of view, how we ought to act and think when loving other people, it fails to provide a complete account of love, crucially leaving out certain key elements from the wide range of loving relationships we find ourselves in, especially romantic love. That is, while Kantian moral love might successfully identify a morally ideal way to love other people, it falls short of capturing the full essence of love—mainly because love is not simply a moral affair but also a matter of the heart. (shrink)

Estudio Bibliográfico de / A Bibliographical Study of: José M. Sevilla, Ragione narrativa e ragione storica. Una prospettiva vichiana su Ortega y Gasset. Introducción de Giuseppe Cacciatore. Guerra Edizioni, Perugia, 2002, pp. 269. I.S.B.N. 88-7715-615-5.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 43 Heft: 1 Seiten: 195-199.

After reviewing the historical fortune of Nietzsche as a political thinker, it is discussed what aspects of his philosophy can be most useful for the deployment of a pluralist democracy, in the sense of political agonism claimed today by some of his interpreters. But the reasons why an articulation of democracy and aristocratic culture is coagulated in his philosophy are also pointed out. For this, the question of the agon in Nietzsche is approached and its discrepancy with the Schmittian idea (...) of the friend-enemy pair, as distinctive of the essence of the political, is pointed out, thus placing the Nietzschean critique of modernity in perspective. (shrink)

The bridge between psychiatry and neuroscience is not the only one we have to build; it is also necessary to narrow the gap between neuroscience and philosophy. This does not imply reducing the latter to the former or vice versa, but rather linking each other without eliminating their own characteristics. Taking that into account, Dan Zahavi’s phenomenology of mind can make a great contribution by presenting itself like a different option within philosophy of mind, which up until the last few (...) years was dominated by the analytic tradition. In this chapter I present Zahavi’s proposal in four steps. Firstly, I clarify the term phenomenology. This question is not accidental because nowadays this concept is used by diverse traditions and with different meanings. Secondly, I make the fundamental distinction between first-person-perspective—which corresponds to Phenomenology—and third-person-perspective—compatible with neuroscience. Thirdly, I explain the methodological stages assumed by Zahavi from the Husserlian tradition. These stages enable him to study from the first-person-perspective rigorously: epoché, phenomenological reduction, eidetic variation, and intersubjective verification. Finally, I develop the issue of naturalization of Phenomenology in order to establish a dialogue between science and philosophy. For Zahavi that naturalization does not necessarily imply reductionism, but can be understood as something necessary for a fruitful exchange between those disciplines. (shrink)

El artículo tiene como objetivo presentar y valorar críticamente la propuesta de John Rogers Searle sobre la libertad. Para esto, en un primer momento mostraremos que para él la libertad debe entenderse desde la perspectiva de la primera persona, es decir desde la experiencia subjetiva. Desde allí establece que la libertad se expresa en el llamado fenómeno de la brecha, es decir, en el salto que experimentamos entre la causa y el efecto en el proceso de realización de una acción. (...) Este salto se manifiesta en los actos llevados a cabo por razones independientes del deseo, como puede observarse en el altruismo fuerte. Y para Searle, solo un Yo, cuyas características emergen del cerebro, puede asumir estas razones para actuar acorde a ellas. En un segundo momento, dedicado a la valoración crítica de la propuesta de Searle, consideramos la importancia de la perspectiva de primera persona para entender la libertad. Luego mostramos que una noción analógica de causa permite entender mejor el acto libre, como así también evitar el dualismo y el reduccionismo materialista. Esta visión, propia de la tradición aristotélico-tomista y que podríamos denominar de tercera persona, debe complementarse con una reflexión desde la interioridad, como realiza Michele Federico Sciacca, es decir, desde una perspectiva de primera persona. Ambas líneas filosóficas confluyen en la consideración metafísica del hombre. Concluimos luego con una breve reflexión sobre el tema del vínculo interdisciplinar como forma de entender las temáticas antropológicas. (shrink)

Online Public Shaming is a form of norm enforcement that involves collectively imposing reputational costs on a person for having a certain kind of moral character. OPS actions aim to disqualify her from public discussion and certain normal human relations. We argue that this constitutes an informal collective punishment that it is presumptively wrong to impose on others. OPS functions as a form of ostracism that fails to show equal basic respect to its targets. Additionally, in seeking to mobilise unconstrained (...) collective power with potentially serious punitive consequences, OPS is incompatible with due process values. (shrink)